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1.Introduction 
 
In 2010 the excessive public spending produced the first sovereign bond market crisis in 
Europe: Greece. The Hellenic crisis is the product of years of recession, of the sluggish economic 
environment and poor productivity – but above all it is the product of the mismanagement of the 
public finance, of unsatisfactory reporting, risk management and accounting practices. Information 
about Greece is scarce and fragmented, but the inability by European authorities to understand the 
incredible mismanagement strongly disappoints the taxpayer. The relevant exposure of European 
banks in the bond market toward the default risk of Greece supports the need for hedging tools, 
such as Credit Default Swaps. However, there is evidence that the CDS market on Greek sovereign 
bonds is segmented, and contracts are mis-priced. The lack of comprehensive data on CDS and 
other OTC contracts impedes any further investigation. European authorities should consider 
revising CDSs trading rules and requirements, until the risks produced are properly limited. 
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2.Greek sovereign debt crisis  
After the subprime credit crisis of 2007, the world is no longer what we thought. An 
unprecedented crisis of confidence was combined with a credit crunch, and the G20 countries had to 
enact massive public spending programmes to save the economy and at least buffer the inevitable 
hard landing. American and European taxpayer paid most of the cost of the crisis, and moral hazard 
has not been yet eliminated. Excessive public spending boosted sovereign debt and financial 
markets became suspicious with weak countries. Greece reported that in 2009 it had run an 
unprecedented deficit of 15.4 per cent of GDP, and that its public debt had skyrocketed to 126.8 per 
cent. The Greek crisis is the product of years of recession, of the sluggish economic environment 
and poor productivity – but above all it is the product of the mismanagement of the public finances 
and of unsatisfactory reporting and accounting practices. 
 
Tab. 1 Greek Government Deficit/Surplus and Debt Levels 
     
 Year   2006 2007 2008 2009 
Net borrowing (-)/ net lending (+) as % of GDP  -5.7%                                    -6.4%                  -9.4%                              -15.4%                     
General government consolidated gross debt as % 
of GDP 106.1% 105.0% 110.3% 126.8% 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority/Eurostat, UniCredit Research, November 2010. 	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Greece entered the European Monetary Union in 2003, but deliberately carried out a series 
of financial operations that were not properly reported. Aim of these operations was to match 
European budget criteria. A comprehensive EU report on this issue (EU, 2010) uses harsh terms to 
describe the conduct of the Greek authorities: “deliberate misreporting”, “methodological 
problems,” “unsatisfactory technical procedures in the Greek statistical institute”, “inappropriate 
governance”, “poor cooperation and lack of clear responsibilities”. The EU notes that  “the most 
recent revisions are an illustration of the lack of quality of Greek fiscal statistics … and show that 
the progress in the compilation of fiscal statistics in the country, and the intense scrutiny by 
Eurostat since 2004, have not sufficed to bring  the quality of Greek fiscal data to the level reached 
by other EU Member States”. It goes on to admit that “Eurostat is at present not in a position to 
validate figures, which are of acceptable statistical quality.” Since 2000 the Commission has revised 
the official Greek data repeatedly, most severely in 2004 and 2009. The defeat is hard to manage in 
Brussels. 
In 2000-02 Greece entered into currency and interest rate swaps with Goldman Sachs to 
hedge risks and reduce the cost of sovereign debt. At the time these transactions were compliant 
with European accounting rules (which were substantially non-existent). Goldman Sachs reports in 
February 2010 that those transactions produced a debt reduction of € 2.367 billion. However, 
Goldman Sachs has not signed any other derivative contract with Greece since 2004, in accordance 
with Eurostat rules. The cost reduction has been produced by the effective currency hedge (of the 
drachma with the dollar and the yen), and by the interest rate hedge. Greece closed out its swap 
deals after 2002, but misreported the remaining streams of interest; in the 2005 and 2008 revisions 
the effects were incorporated and the data revised retroactively. According to the EU, this was a 
case of deliberate misreporting. 
Piga (2001) investigated the use of interest and exchange rate swaps by European states 
prior to monetary union, concluding that some countries used these instruments not only to hedge 
and reduce public debt risks but also as window-dressing – shifting interest payments forward in 
order to reduce deficit and debt ratios, and then qualify for membership in the Monetary Union. 
Greece is part of this group, as is Italy. The key point, however, is that the Greece window-dressing 
continued even after adoption of the single currency.  
In 2004 and 2005, with the application of new Eurostat rules, swaps contracts were closed 
out; the resulting costs or gains were counted towards the fiscal outturn in these years. Terminating 
the contracts before scheduled maturity meant amortizing the costs over a shorter period, and the 
reduction in the cost of the debt was wiped out (as it was not realized). As a result the net present 
value turned negative, aggravating the deficit in 2004 and 2005. But Greece did not record these 
events properly in the accounts2. The EU revised Greek data, sharply raising debt and deficit ratios. 
According to the EU report and the press,3 Greece continued to enter into swaps after 2005 
but not directly.  That is, it acted through other institutions, as the EU report describes in detail. The 
Greek government financed the deficit through the National Bank of Greece (a commercial bank), 
violating the Maastricht rules. In 2008 the National Bank of Greece accessed European Central 
Bank refinancing, posting as collateral notes issued by Titlos Plc. Titlos Plc is a Special Purpose 
Vehicle – created by the National Bank of Greece itself together with Goldman Sachs – that sold € 
5.1 billion worth of notes maturing in February 2039 to the National Bank of Greece. But the Greek 
Treasury wholly owns the National Bank, so this would appear to be a way of financing the debt but 
circumventing controls and prohibitions. The end result is that the Treasury’s deficit was securitized 
through the National Bank of Greece, which gets liquidity from the ECB thanks to the Titlos notes. 
The final cost of the Greek debt is thus the ECB’s main refinancing rate. These operations represent 
a fraudulent violation of European accounting rules, in that they do not reflect the greater risk of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2EU report (2010), p. 22. 
3Wall Street Journal, 23 February 2010. 
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Greek sovereign debt (as measured by its spread with respect to German Bunds). 
 
Fig. 1 Spreads of weak European countries’ bonds 2007-10 (OCSE) 
 
 
3. The Greek rescue plan of 2010-11 
In December 2009 the European Central Bank published a legal-studies working paper 
entitled “Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU.” Apart from the publication’s timing, 
which is hard to see as merely coincidental, the conclusion is that the extreme solution (expulsion) 
cannot be precluded; it is just very complicated, now that the Lisbon Treaty has been adopted and a 
very large majority would be required. An easier solution would be voluntary withdrawal from the 
EU, which would certainly be less expensive for all concerned. A member state’s withdrawal from 
the EMU would certainly have an adverse impact on the credibility of the monetary union itself, but 
it would also strengthen the constraints for those that remain. The balance between pros and cons is 
not merely economic, of course, and the final decision has already been taken. The Ecofin Council 
has moved to save Greece. 
The Greek crisis exploded in January 2010, and the Hellenic government was forced to 
undertake a severe austerity plan. According to official releases, the deficit will be reduced by 
spending reduction (sharp cuts in civil servants’ pay and benefits), pension reform (whose effects 
will be realized over a decade) and tax increases (VAT from 19 per cent to 21 per cent, and the 
elimination of many tax deductions and exemptions). The austerity plan projects the public debt 
going down to 100 per cent of GDP by 2020. The European Financial Stability Fund will stabilize 
liquidity. The parliamentary elections of October 2010 returned the majority of Prime Minister 
George Papandreou (Pasok party), thereby confirming popular backing for his draconian austerity 
plan. The spending cuts are combined with reduced public hiring, at the expense of the younger 
generations. The public sector overhaul provokes social and political conflict, fuels disorder and 
decreases the likelihood of success. 
The most complicated aspects of the plan is slimming Greece’s bloated public sector and 
eliminating massive tax evasion (especially of VAT). These two problems cannot be solved by 
spending cuts alone. Organizational overhaul is needed. The Hellenic state currently hires almost 
40% of working population, creating distortions in the pricing and equilibrium of the labour market. 
In March 2010 Greece asked for the help of the EU and the IMF. After prolonged 
discussion, a 3-year rescue plan worth €110 billion was agreed on.  
 
4. Who owns Greek bonds and risk? 
According to BIS data referring to September 2010, German and French banks held 
respectively US$ 40.3 and US$ 59.4 billion of Greek debts (sovereign, corporate and private), and 
US$ 108 billion is held by the ECB; the first figure refers to the public and private wealth (i.e. 
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sovereign bonds, shares, and other private liabilities), while the second is the product of the Ecofin 
rescue plan (i.e. sovereign bonds). American and British banks have a smaller exposure. 
The moral hazard in this crisis is relevant; the banking industry is exposed toward the 
sovereign risk, and the rescue plan has positively influenced their risk exposure. The sustainability 
of the rescue plan is of central importance to avoid a new banking crisis.  
The rating of Greek bonds fell to BB+ in 2010, and most of the Greek debt is now sold off-
market, in order to avoid excessive interest payments. The yield on Greek sovereign bonds has 
trended upward throughout the year, and in May 2011 it has been downgrade to junk level. 
In 2011 worth €22 billions Greek public bonds expire and other €33 billions in 2012, 
Greece cannot re-finance these amounts, and some European countries are against a new rescue 
plan without any collateral. According to first consultations as of May 2011, Greece will be 
requested to employ privatisation to directly re-finance public debt and European creditors. To avert 
another Russian-style crisis, the IMF and the EU make regular visits to Greece to verify the 
country’s effective ability to implement the plan. The withdrawal from the Union cannot be still 
ruled out. 
 
Fig. 2 Banks sovereign risk exposure (WSJ, May 16 2011) 
 
 
 
 
5.CDS on Greek bonds: the missing link 
Financial derivatives can be employed to smooth the costs of debt, and to hedge outstanding 
debt; this is coherent with the efficient market hypothesis that justified the weak control and 
monitoring on deregulated financial markets and instruments. Credit default swaps (CDS) are very 
popular financial contracts suitable for hedging credit risks; they traded Over The Counter (OTC), 
and volumes of trading increased in the recent. The information disclosed about this market is very 
poor; nominal volumes are monitored by the BIS (http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1011.htm ), but 
nominal values are inflated and do not reflect the effective liquidity of this market.  
The BIS reports in June 2010 that US$2.4 billion of CDS on sovereign bonds are traded 
(measured at their notional amount) over a total of worth US$ 18.4 billion; nothing is known about 
who is holding such contracts (i.e. hedgers or not) and about the potential domino effect. The 
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structure of CDS contracts is such that protections sellers are exposed to sovereign default risk; 
sellers can be banks, insurance companies, and financial and non-financial institutions. According 
to BIS data, dealers trade over 50% of contracts (measured at notional amount), roughly US$ 16 
billion out of total US$ 23 billion, while banks trade at their name just US$ 4 billion. Non-financial 
institutions, hedge funds and insurance trade around 5% of the market each. Maturity is mostly 
between 1 and 5 years. Dealers usually trade at banks, and then we can consider that the banking 
system trades more than 50% of CDS; data on CDS on sovereign bonds basing on reporting 
institution is not provided. The distribution of counterparties and risks in the CDS market is not 
known, since there is no central clearing process; this “known unknown” confirms the need for 
further investigation. 
 
Tab.2 Credit Default Swaps Market 
Single-name instruments Notional amounts outstanding at end June 2010 
In millions of US dollars 
Instrument/counterparty 
Notional 
amounts 
outstanding 
bought 
Notional 
amounts 
outstanding 
sold 
Total 
Total single-name instruments 14,486,640 14,366,151 18,379,414 
        
  Reporting dealers 10,475,547   10,471,207 10,473,377 
  Other financial institutions 3,804,347   3,718,929 7,523,276 
       Banks and security firms 2,563,877  2,421,982  4,985,859 
       Central counterparties 585.279 570,580 1,155,859 
       Insurance and financial guaranty firms 82,096   48,782 130.878 
       SPVs, SPCs and SPEs 84,387   91,892 176.279 
       Hedge funds 161,830   262,853 424.683 
       Other financial customers 326,879   322,839 649.718 
        
Non-financial institutions 206,746   176,015 382.761 
        
Maturity of one year or less 1,836,178   1,820,806 2,333,557 
Maturity over 1 year and up to 5 years 9,892,247   9,854,231 12,482,355 
Maturity over 5 years 2,758,213   2,691,114 3,563,500 
        
Sovereigns 1,868,957   1,843,525        2,392,475 
Non-sovereigns 12,617,689   12,522,627 15,986,947 
        
Investment grade 10,045,975   9,950,618 12,812,872 
        
Below investment grade 3,271,847   3,289,147 4,079,331 
Non-rated 1,168,823   1,126,387 1,487,218 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, May 2011.    
 
The finance literature has investigated the CDS theoretical behaviour and contribution in 
financial markets; empirical investigations on CDS pricing are rare, due to scarcity of data. Ericsson 
et al (2009) investigated the explanatory power of variables that in theory should determine credit 
spreads; their results confirm that volatility, firm leverage and the riskless interest rate play a role. 
Nevertheless, results change dramatically if considering levels or differences, and considering 
different econometric methods. This confirms our suspect of mis-functioning. 
The booming public debt has influenced the spread of bonds, but with asymmetric effects on 
the primary and the secondary markets. The primary market still enjoys reasonable prices; demand 
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and supply meet and demand actually overcome supply for most European countries. This happens 
because of excess supply of money created by central banks (European, Japanese and American). 
Small returns on sovereign bonds come with small risk, and risk neutral or risk adverse institutional 
investors like pension funds, public firms and insurance companies prefer this market basically for 
statutory reasons. 
The so-called Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) manoeuvre of the US Federal Reserve bought 
roughly US$ 600 Billion Treasury bonds to sustain the market and the recovery process (Board of 
Governors, 2010-11). The European central bank is far more opaque in its action and does not 
disclose its assets and portfolio strategy, but inundated the market as well. The Japanese central 
bank is printing money for free since 1998.  
On the contrary, aggressive operators with risk loving attitude populate the secondary market 
(hedge funds, investments banks and others); they do not enjoy the direct effects of central banks 
liquidity. Higher spreads of the secondary markets reflect not only the effective risk of certain 
debtors (like Greece), but also the high speed of adjustment of risk-lover operators, fuelling further 
volatility. The pricing mechanism is not working properly, and the fundamental condition of 
absence of arbitrage cannot be verified. 
 
Fig. 3 Yield of Greek 10Y bonds 2010-11 (Bloomberg) 
 
 
Issues that need to be clarified with respect to the role of CDS on sovereign bonds are 
basically: the difficulty in CDS clearing and management; the liquidity; the value of the assets 
underlying the swap contract.  
• The CDS market is populated by unregulated operators, is OTC and then not 
accessible by retail customers, contracts are priced in US$, transparency is not required. 
According to Shadab (2009), CDS are superior to securitization in transferring risks and the 
crisis has been the result not of the financial instruments themselves, but was due to their 
concentration outside the regulated financial system, under no compensation system. The 
US Federal Reserve of New York (2010) aims at introducing a centralized clearing system 
(i.e. electronic trading platforms) to promote efficiency; however, there will remain a 
population of customized contracts managed bilaterally. The EU Commission is considering 
the introduction of a clearing-house system for OTC derivatives trading (EU 2009-10); this 
would improve the settlement and pricing, but would reduce the attractiveness of OTC 
market, pushing for new innovations (Shadab, 2009 reached the same conclusion for the 
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American financial system). The alternative solution would be to introduce some forms of 
capital requirements. This seems to be more reasonable, although not very easy to 
implement. The EU antitrust commission in May 2011 started the investigation of the 
degree of concentration of dealers in the CDS market, in order to avoid any violation of 
competition rules and maintain financial stability (EU Antitrust 2011). 
• What is the liquidity of the CDS market? Answering is not easy, since OTC 
derivatives markets are not liquid by definition, but can “substitute liquidity”. The liquidity 
necessary to open a position in the CDS market is far smaller than in the secondary or 
primary bond market, but the underlying risk is the same. The liquidity is so abundant in the 
primary bond market that spreads do not reflect effective risks (e.g. Greek bonds). On the 
contrary the spreads in the secondary market reflect both risks and lack of confidence; CDS 
market behaves like the secondary market that is completely absent for Greece (i.e. illiquid), 
markets are segmented and pricing is inefficient (since spreads on the same bond are 
different in the primary and secondary markets). The trading of CDS is coherent with 
portfolios exposed to sovereign bonds; CDS are traded to replicate the illiquid secondary 
market and create credit link notes4. With credit link notes the investor buys the same risk of 
bond, without investing the same amount of money; this happens under no supervision on 
the distribution of risks created in the CDS and CLN markets (counterparty information is 
undisclosed).  
• If the pricing mechanism is not efficient, either contracts are mis-priced or the value 
of the underlying assets is not univocally defined (i.e. multiple equilibrium). I do believe in 
the second explanation because of market segmentation. Considering the asset swap can be 
the counterproof; asset swap represents the degree of confidence of investors in that class of 
assets. Actually the Greek situation is such that it can either default or not, there is no 
Chapt.11 creditor protection, and in case of bankrupt losses are 100% for creditors. Asset 
swap on Greek sovereign bonds confirms a high level of confidence that comes from the 
primary market, because the value of the underlying asset is priced considering a 0% 
probability of default. If Greece defaults the entire Euro area goes into a deep crisis 
(contagion to Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the primary market does not price this event. 
The secondary market on the contrary attacks some probability to the Greek restructuring 
debt, since the path of public debt seems to be unsustainable. The mis-pricing between the 
underlying and the swap contract violates the pricing rules of derivatives. 
 
According to these 3 fundamental issues, CDS represents a small dangerous threat to financial 
stability because of the opacity, the absence of a compensation system, the liquidity that is not 
distributed uniformly, and the mis-pricing of contracts.  
 
6.Conclusion 
Following the underestimation of the risks and repercussions of mortgage-backed securities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A credit-linked note (CLN) is a derivative which offers synthetic exposure on an credit default swap (CDS).  CLN are 
structured securities whose principal and interest payments are contingent on the performance of specified borrower 
companies, or Reference Entities. They are created by embedding a Credit Default Swap (CDS) in a funded asset to 
form an investment whose credit risk and cash flow characteristics resemble those of a bond or loan. The difference 
between a CDS and CLN is that the credit-linked note is an on-balance sheet item.  CLNs are primarily used for credit 
default swaps, but can be used as a hedge for other forms of debt.  A company looking to spread its risk for a specific 
credit event will look to issue CLNs in order to transfer this exposure to credit investors.  Special Purpose Companies 
(SPC) or trusts create the CLNs, which start out with a AAA credit rating and then act as a broker between the credit 
issuer (company) and credit investors.  These notes are offered to investors as both a credit default swap (riskier 
investment) and the AAA bond at par value.  Credit investors are willing take on this credit risk in hopes of receiving a 
higher yield on their investments than with typical bonds.  The trust or third party will then sell default protection in 
return for a premium that subsidizes the coupon payments to be made to the holder of the CLN.  Hence the credit 
investor has exposure to both the CLN and the credit issuer.  
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and credit default swaps, the Greek crisis confirms that the world has changed with the spread of 
derivatives in global financial markets. Complex derivatives make transactions and balance sheets 
more opaque, opening up opportunities for subprime and predatory lending and the mismanagement 
of public debt. The GASB principles (i.e. fair value) will ensure better measurement of countries’ 
effective risk exposure, but they will also make total balance sheet size more dependent on financial 
market cycles and increase the volatility of the debt. 
The EU official documents make it clear that Greece did not actually violate proper 
accounting rules, which were not introduced until after the derivative contracts were made; but it 
did violate the principles and limits imposed by the European treaties, omitting relevant 
information. The market accordingly punished it by lowering the country’s credit rating to a level 
that forced international institutions to intervene as lender of last resort. The expulsion or 
withdrawal of Greece from the Union would be politically unsustainable, which will presumably 
help the other peripheral EU member states with troubled finances (Portugal, Ireland and Spain) in 
2011-12. The numerous revisions of the Greek public accounting data and the subsequent crisis 
confirm that the incentives to cheat far exceeded the potential cost, and disappoint the European 
taxpayer to a larger extent. The condition for the rescue plan to succeed in the medium term is that 
its costs (austerity plan) have not to exceed revenues (debt bail out). Most economic analyses see 
the solution in productivity improvements, which can speed Greek economic growth and thus ease 
the burden of debt. Such a structural overhaul can only come from national policy, with reforms that 
so far are only minimally under way.  
 The relevant exposure of European banks toward the default risk of Greece supports the 
need for hedging tools, such as CDS; the ECB, German and French banks held around US$ 210 
billion of Greek liabilities as of Sept. 2010. However, the CDS market is not efficient and is 
segmented. The primary bond market is populated by risk-neutral or risk-averse operators and is 
inundated by central banks liquidity (i.e. squeezing spreads); the secondary market is very volatile 
and dried (and spreads explode), and the missing link is the CDS market. The re-packaging of risks 
in portfolios implemented by banks is very difficult in the presence of structural weaknesses in the 
pricing mechanism. The moral hazard of CDS trading by the banking system is not negligible, since 
banks own a large amount of the underlying risk, but according to available data its magnitude 
cannot be evaluated. This lack of data represents a further danger to financial stability. 
International financial institutions have supported the spread and use of financial derivatives, 
including CDS to smooth the cost of debt and/or hedge, but CDS on sovereign bonds represents a 
small dangerous threat to financial stability because of the opacity, the absence of a compensation 
system, the liquidity that is not distributed uniformly, and the mis-pricing of such contract. 
9 	  
References 
 
1. BIS (2008), “The basic mechanics of FX swaps and cross-currency basis swaps,” Quarterly 
Review, March. (http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0803z.htm) 
2. Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve (2011), Credit and Liquidity Programs and the 
Balance Sheet 2010-11 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm).  
3. Ericsson J., Jacobs K., Oviedo R. (2009), The determinants of credit default swaps spreads, 
Journal fo financial and quantitative analysis, 44(1), p.109-132. 
4. European Central Bank (2009), “Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU,” Legal 
Working Paper no.10, December. (http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf) 
5. European Commission (2010), Report on Greek government debt and deficit statistics, 8 
January. 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/COM_2010_REPORT_GREEK/EN/CO
M_2010_REPORT_GREEK-EN.PDF) 
6. European Union Committee-House of Lords (2009), The future regulation of derivatives 
markets: is the EU on the right track? 10th Report of Session 2009-10. 
7. European Union Antitrust Commission probes Credit Default Swaps market, 29 April 2011 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/509&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en) 
8. Federal Reserve of New York (2010), Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives market 
Infrastructures, Staff Report n. 424, January. 
9. G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors February 18-19, 2011, Paris. 
10. International Monetary Fund (2010), “Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Interim 
Review Mission to Greece,” Press Release no. 10/246, 17 June. 
11. Oldani, C. (2008), Governing Global Derivatives, Ashgate Publishing, November 
(http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&title_id=9091&edition_id=11507&calcTitle
=1) 
12. Oldani, C., and P. Savona (2005), “Derivatives, fiscal policy and financial stability”, ICFAI 
Journal of Derivatives Markets, vol. II no. 3, July, pp. 7-25 
13. Piga, G. (2001), Derivatives and Public Debt Management, Council of Foreign Relations, New 
York. 
14. Shadab H.B. (2009), Guilty by association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, Entrepreneurial 
Business Law Journal, Fall. 
15. Wall Street Journal, various issues (http://europe.wsj.com/home-page) 
 
 
